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Abstract
We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selﬁsh routing game. Speciﬁcally, we assume
a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m
parallel identical links, to control the routing of its own assigned trafﬁc. In a Nash equilibrium, each
user selﬁshly routes its trafﬁc on those links that minimize its expected latency cost. The social cost
of a Nash equilibrium is the expectation, over all random choices of the users, of the maximum, over
all links, latency through a link.
We provide substantial evidence for the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, which states
that the worst Nash equilibrium is the fully mixed Nash equilibrium, where each user chooses each link
with positive probability. Speciﬁcally, we prove that the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture is
valid for pure Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we show, that under a certain condition, the social cost
of any Nash equilibrium is within a factor of 2h(1+ ε) of that of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium,
where h is the factor by which the largest user trafﬁc deviates from the average user trafﬁc.
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Considering pure Nash equilibria, we provide a PTAS to approximate the best social cost, we give
an upper bound on the worst social cost and we show that it isNP-hard to approximate the worst
social cost within a multiplicative factor better than 2− 2/(m+ 1).
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and framework
A Nash equilibrium [22,23] represents a stable state of the play of a strategic game, in
which each player holds an accurate opinion about the (expected) behavior of other players
and acts rationally. An issue that arises naturally in this context concerns the computational
complexity of Nash equilibria of any given strategic game. Due to the ultimate signiﬁcance
of Nash equilibrium as a prime solution concept in contemporary Game Theory [24], this
issue has become a fundamental algorithmic problem that is being intensively studied in
the Theory of Computing community today (see, e.g., [4,7,31]); in fact, it is arguably one
of the few, most important algorithmic problems for which no general polynomial-time
algorithms are known today (cf. [26]).
The problem of computing arbitrary Nash equilibria becomes even more challenging
when one considers extreme Nash equilibria, ones that maximize or minimize a certain
objective function. So, understanding the combinatorial structure of extreme Nash
equilibria is a necessary prerequisite to either designing efﬁcient algorithms to compute
them or establishing corresponding hardness and thereby designing efﬁcient
approximation algorithms. In this work, we embark on a systematic study of the
combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of extreme Nash equilibria;
our study is carried out within the context of a simple selﬁsh routing game, originally intro-
duced in a pioneering work by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16], that we
describe next.
We assume a collection of n users, each employing amixed strategy, which is a probability
distribution overm parallel links, to control the shipping of its own assigned trafﬁc. For each
link, a capacity speciﬁes the rate at which the link processes trafﬁc. In a Nash equilibrium,
each user selﬁshly routes its trafﬁc on those links that minimize its expected latency cost,
given the network congestion caused by the other users. A user’s support is the set of those
links on which it may ship its trafﬁc with non-zero probability. The social cost of a Nash
equilibrium is the expectation, over all random choices of the users, of the maximum, over
all links, latency through a link.
Our study distinguishes between pure Nash equilibria, where each user chooses exactly
one link (with probability one), and mixed Nash equilibria, where the choices of each user
are modeled by a probability distribution over links. We also distinguish in some cases
between models of identical capacities, where all link capacities are equal, and of arbitrary
capacities.
M. Gairing et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 343 (2005) 133–157 135
1.2. The fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture
In this work, we formulate and study a natural conjecture asserting that the fully mixed
Nash equilibrium F is the worst Nash equilibrium with respect to social cost. Formally, we
conjecture:
Conjecture 1.1 (Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture). For any trafﬁc vectorw such
that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F exists, and for any Nash equilibrium P, SC(w,P)
SC(w,F).
Clearly, the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture is intuitive and natural: the fully
mixed Nash equilibrium favors “collisions” between different users (since each user as-
signs its trafﬁc with positive probability to every link); thus, this increased probability
of “collisions” favors a corresponding increase to the (expected) maximum total trafﬁc
through a link, which is, precisely, the social cost. More importantly, the Fully Mixed Nash
Equilibrium Conjecture is also signiﬁcant since it precisely identiﬁes the worst possible
Nash equilibrium for the selﬁsh routing game we consider; this will enable designers of
Internet protocols not only to avoid choosing the worst-case Nash equilibrium, but also to
calculate the worst-case loss to the system at any Nash equilibrium due to its deliberate
lack of coordination, and to evaluate the Nash equilibrium of choice against the (provably)
worst-case one.
1.3. Contribution and signiﬁcance
Our study provides quite strong evidence in support of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilib-
rium Conjecture by either establishing or near establishing the conjecture in a number of
interesting instances of the problem.
We start with the model of arbitrary capacities, where trafﬁcs are allowed to vary arbitrar-
ily. There we prove that the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture holds for pure Nash
equilibria. We next turn to the case of identical capacities. Through a delicate probabilistic
analysis, we establish that in the special case, the number of links is equal to the number
of users and for a suitable large number of users, the social cost of any Nash equilibrium
is less than 2h(1 + ε) (for any ε > 0) times the social cost of the fully mixed Nash equi-
librium, where h is the factor by which the largest user trafﬁc deviates from the average
user trafﬁc. Our proof employs concepts and techniques from majorization theory [18] and
stochastic orders [30], such as comparing two randomvariables according to their stochastic
variability (cf. [28, Section 9.5]).
For pure Nash equilibria we show that it isNP-hard to decide whether or not any given
allocation of users to links can be transformed into a pure Nash equilibrium using at most
k selﬁsh steps, even if the number of links is 2. Furthermore, we prove that there exists
a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) to approximate the social cost of the
best pure Nash equilibrium to any arbitrary accuracy. The proof involves an algorithm that
transforms any pure strategy proﬁle into a pure Nash equilibrium with at most the same
social cost, using at most n reassignments of users. We call this technique Nashiﬁcation,
and it may apply to other instances of the problem as well.
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Still for pure Nash equilibria, we give a tight upper bound on the ratio between SC(w,L)
andOPT(w) for any Nash equilibrium L. Then we show that it isNP-hard to approximate
the worst-case Nash equilibrium with a ratio that is better than this upper bound. We close
our section about pure Nash equilibria with a pseudopolynomial algorithm for computing
the worst-case Nash equilibrium for any ﬁxed number of links.
1.4. Related work and comparison
The selﬁsh routing game considered in this paper was ﬁrst introduced by Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou [16] as a vehicle for the study of the price of selﬁshness for routing over
non-cooperative networks, subsequently studied in the work of Mavronicolas and Spirakis
[19], where fully mixed Nash equilibria were introduced and analyzed. In both works,
the aim had been to quantify the amount of performance loss in routing due to selﬁsh
behavior of the users. (Later studies of the selﬁsh routing game from the same point of
view, that of performance, include the works by Koutsoupias et al. [15] and by Czumaj and
Vöcking [2].)
The closest to our work is the one by Fotakis et al. [7], which focuses on the combinatorial
structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for the selﬁsh routing game
we consider. The Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture formulated and systematically
studied in this paper has been inspired by two results due to Fotakis et al. [7] that conﬁrm
or support the conjecture. First, Fotakis et al. [7, Theorem 4.2] establish the Fully Mixed
Nash EquilibriumConjecture for the model of identical capacities and assuming that n = 2.
Second, Fotakis et al. [7, Theorem 4.3] establish that, for the model of arbitrary capacities,
the social cost of any Nash equilibrium is no more than 49.02 times the social cost of the
(generalized) fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
The routing problem considered in this paper is equivalent to the multiprocessor schedul-
ing problem. Here, pure Nash equilibria and Nashiﬁcation translate to local optima and
sequences of local improvements. A schedule is said to be jump optimal if no job on a
processor with maximum load can improve by moving to another processor [29].
Obviously, the set of pure Nash equilibria is a subset of the set of jump optimal schedules.
Moreover, in the model of identical processors every jump optimal schedule can be trans-
formed into a pure Nash equilibrium without altering the makespan. Thus, for this model
the strict upper bound 2−2/(m+1) on the ratio between best and worst makespan of jump
optimal schedules [6,29] also holds for pure Nash equilibria.
Algorithms for computing a jump optimal schedule from any given schedule have been
proposed in [1,6,29]. The fastest algorithm is given by Schuurman and Vredeveld [29]. It
always moves the job with maximumweight from amakespan processor to a processor with
minimum load, using O(n) moves. However, in all algorithms the resulting jump optimal
schedule is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium.
1.5. Road map
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminaries.
Stochastic orders are treated in Section 3. Pure Nash equilibria are contrasted to the fully
mixed Nash equilibrium in Section 4. Worst mixed Nash equilibria are contrasted to the
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fully mixed Nash equilibrium in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 consider best and worst pure
Nash equilibria, respectively. We conclude, in Section 8, with a discussion of our results
and some open problems.
2. Framework
Most of our deﬁnitions are patterned after those in [19, Section 2] and [7, Section 2],
which, in turn, were based on those in [16, Sections 1 and 2].
2.1. Mathematical preliminaries and notation
For any integer m1, denote [m] = {1, . . . , m}. Denote  the Gamma function; that is,
for any natural number N, (N + 1) = N !, while for any arbitrary real number x > 0,
(x) = ∫∞0 tx−1e−t dt . The Gamma function is invertible; both  and its inverse −1 are
increasing. It is well known that −1(N) = (logN/ log logN)(1+ o(1)) (see, e.g., [10]).
For our purposes, we shall use the fact that for any pair of an arbitrary real number  and an
arbitrary natural number N, (/e) = N if and only if  = −1(N) +(1). For an event
E in a sample space, denote Pr(E) the probability of event E happening.
For a randomvariableX, denote E(X) the expectation ofX. In the balls-and-bins problem,
m balls are thrown into m bins uniformly at random. (See [14] for a classical introduction
to this problem.) It is known that the expected maximum number of balls thrown over a bin
equals the quantity R(m) = −1(m)− 32 + o(1) [10].
In the paper, we make use of the following inequality, which holds due to Hoeffding.
Theorem 2.1 (McDiarmid [20, Theorem 2.3]). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent ran-
dom variables with 0Xk1 for each k. Let Sn = ∑Xk and  = E(Sn). Then, for any
 > 0,
Pr(Sn(1+ ))e−((1+)ln(1+)−).
Note that if 0Xk for all k ∈ [n] and for some constant  > 0, then for any  > 0,
Pr(Sn(1+ ))e−((1+)ln(1+)−)


.
2.2. General
We consider a network consisting of a set of m parallel links 1, 2, . . . , m from a source
node to a destination node. Each of n network users 1, 2, . . . , n, or users for short, wishes
to route a particular amount of trafﬁc along a (non-ﬁxed) link from source to destination.
Denote wi the trafﬁc of user i ∈ [n]. Deﬁne the n × 1 trafﬁc vector w in the natural way.
Assume throughout that m > 1 and n > 1. Assume also, without loss of generality, that
w1w2 · · · wn. For a trafﬁc vector w, denote W = ∑n1 wi . Deﬁne h as the factor by
which the largest user trafﬁc deviates from the average user trafﬁc, thus, h = w1 nW .
A pure strategy for user i ∈ [n] is some speciﬁc link. A mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n]
is a probability distribution over pure strategies; thus, a mixed strategy is a probability
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distribution over the set of links. The support of the mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n], denoted
support(i), is the set of those pure strategies (links) to which i assigns positive probability.
A pure strategy proﬁle is represented by an n-tuple 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉 ∈ [m]n; a mixed
strategy proﬁle is represented by an n × m probability matrix P of nm probabilities pji ,
i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], where pji is the probability that user i chooses link j. For a probability
matrix P, deﬁne indicator variables I i ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [n] and  ∈ [m], such that I i = 1
if and only if pi > 0. Thus, the support of the mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n] is the set
{ ∈ [m]|I i = 1}.
For each link  ∈ [m], deﬁne the view of link , denoted view(), as the set of users
i ∈ [n] that potentially assign their trafﬁcs to link ; so, view() = {i ∈ [n]|I i = 1}.
For each link  ∈ [m], denote V  = |view()|. A mixed strategy proﬁle P is fully mixed
[19, Section 2.2] if for all users i ∈ [n] and links j ∈ [m], I ji = 1. 1
2.3. System, models and cost measures
Denote c > 0 the capacity of link  ∈ [m], representing the rate at which the link
processes trafﬁc. So, the latency for trafﬁc w through link  equals w/c. In the model of
identical capacities, all link capacities are equal to 1; link capacities may vary arbitrarily in
the model of arbitrary capacities. For a pure strategy proﬁle 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉, the latency
cost for user i, denoted i , is (
∑
k:k=i wk)/c
i ; that is, the latency cost for user i is the
latency of the link it chooses. For a mixed strategy proﬁle P, denote  the actual trafﬁc
on link  ∈ [m]; so,  is a random variable for each link  ∈ [m], denote  the expected
trafﬁc on link  ∈ [m]; thus,  = E() =∑ni=1 pi wi . Given P, deﬁne them×1 expected
trafﬁc vector  induced by P in the natural way. Given P, denote 	 the expected latency
on link  ∈ [m]; clearly, 	 = /c. Deﬁne the m × 1 expected latency vector  in the
natural way. For a mixed strategy proﬁle P, the expected latency cost for user i ∈ [n] on
link  ∈ [m], denoted i , is the expectation, over all random choices of the remaining users,
of the latency cost for user i had its trafﬁc been assigned to link ; thus,
i =
wi + ∑k=1,k =i pkwk
c
= (1− p

i )wi + 
c
.
For each user i ∈ [n], theminimum expected latency cost, denoted i , is the minimum, over
all links  ∈ [m], of the expected latency cost for user i on link ; thus, i = min∈[m] i .
For a probability matrix P, deﬁne the n×1minimum expected latency cost vector  induced
by P in the natural way.
Associated with a trafﬁc vector w and a mixed strategy proﬁle P is the social cost [16,
Section 2], denoted SC(w,P), which is the expectation, over all random choices of the
1An earlier treatment of fully mixed strategies in the context of bimatrix games has been found in [27], called
there completely mixed strategies. See also [21] for a subsequent treatment in the context of strategically zero-sum
games. Datta [3] studied recently some universality properties of fully mixed Nash equilibria (calling them totally
mixed).
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users, of the maximum (over all links) latency of trafﬁc through a link; thus,
SC(w,P)= E
(
max
∈[m]
∑
k:k= wk
c
)
= ∑
〈1,2,...,n〉∈[m]n
(
n∏
k=1
p
k
k · max
∈[m]
∑
k:k= wk
c
)
.
Note that SC(w,P) reduces to the maximum latency through a link in the case of pure
strategies. On the other hand, the social optimum [16, Section 2] associated with a trafﬁc
vector w, denotedOPT(w), is the least possiblemaximum (over all links) latency of trafﬁc
through a link; thus,
OPT(w) = min〈1,2,...,n〉∈[m]n max∈[m]
∑
k:k= wk
c
.
2.4. Nash equilibria
We are interested in a special class of mixed strategies called Nash equilibria [22,23] that
we describe below. Say that a user i ∈ [n] is satisﬁed for the probability matrix P if for
all links  ∈ [m], i = i if I i = 1, and i > i if I i = 0; thus, a satisﬁed user has no
incentive to unilaterally deviate from its mixed strategy. A user i ∈ [n] is unsatisﬁed for
the probability matrix P if i is not satisﬁed for the probability matrix P. The probability
matrix P is a Nash equilibrium [16, Section 2] if for all users i ∈ [n] and links  ∈ [m],
i = i if I i = 1, and i > i if I i = 0. Thus, each user assigns its trafﬁc with positive
probability only on links (possibly more than one of them) for which its expected latency
cost is minimized. The fully mixed Nash equilibrium [19], denoted F, is a Nash equilibrium
that is a fully mixed strategy. Mavronicolas and Spirakis [19, Lemma 15] show that all
links are equiprobable in a fully mixed Nash equilibrium, which is unique (for the model
of identical capacities).
Fix any trafﬁc vector w. The worst Nash equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium P that
maximizes SC(w,P); the best Nash equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium that minimizes
SC(w,P). The worst social cost, denoted WC(w), is the social cost of the worst Nash
equilibrium; correspondingly, the best social cost, denoted BC(w), is the social cost of the
best Nash equilibrium.
Fotakis et al. [7, Theorem 1] consider starting from any arbitrary pure strategy proﬁle
and following a particular sequence of selﬁsh steps, where in a selﬁsh step, exactly one
unsatisﬁed user is allowed to change its pure strategy. A selﬁsh step is a greedy selﬁsh
step if the unsatisﬁed user chooses its best link. A (greedy) selﬁsh step does not increase
the social cost of the initial pure strategy proﬁle. Fotakis et al. [7, Theorem 1] show that
this sequence of selﬁsh steps eventually converges to a Nash equilibrium, which proves its
existence; however, it may take a large number of steps. It follows that if the initial pure
strategy proﬁle has minimum social cost, then the resulting (pure) Nash equilibrium will
have minimum social cost as well. This implies that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium
with minimum social cost. Thus, we have BC(w) = OPT(w).
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2.5. Algorithmic problems
We list a few algorithmic problems related to Nash equilibria that will be considered
in this work. The deﬁnitions are given in the style of Garey and Johnson [9]. A prob-
lem instance is a tuple (n,m,w, c), where n is the number of users, m is the number
of links, w = (wi) is a vector of n user trafﬁcs and c = (cj ) is a vector of m link
capacities.
1: NASH EQUILIBRIUM SUPPORTS
INSTANCE: A problem instance (n,m,w, c).
OUTPUT: Indicator variables I ji ∈ {0, 1}, where i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], that support a Nash
equilibrium for the system of the users and the links.
Fotakis et al. [7, Theorem 2] establish that NASH EQUILIBRIUM SUPPORTS is in
P when restricted to pure equilibria. We continue with two complementary to each other
optimization problems (with respect to social cost).
2: BEST NASH EQUILIBRIUM SUPPORTS
INSTANCE: A problem instance (n,m,w, c).
OUTPUT: Indicator variables I ji ∈ {0, 1}, where i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], that support the best
Nash equilibrium for the system of the users and the links.
3:WORST NASH EQUILIBRIUM SUPPORTS
INSTANCE: A problem instance (n,m,w, c).
OUTPUT: Indicator variables I ji ∈ {0, 1}, where i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], that support the worst
Nash equilibrium for the system of the users and the links.
Fotakis et al. [7, Theorems 3 and 4] establish that both BEST NASH EQUILIBRIUM
SUPPORTS and WORST NASH EQUILIBRIUM SUPPORTS are NP-hard. Since
both problems can be formulated as an integer program, it follows that they are NP-
complete.
4: NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL COST
INSTANCE: A problem instance (n,m,w, c); a Nash equilibrium P for the system of the
users and the links.
OUTPUT: The social cost of the Nash equilibrium P.
Fotakis et al. [7, Theorem 8] establish that NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL COST is
#P-complete. Furthermore, Fotakis et al. [7, Theorem 9] show that there exists a fully poly-
nomial, randomized approximation scheme for NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL COST.
The following two problems, inspired by NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL COST , are
introduced for the ﬁrst time in this work.
5:WORST NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL COST
INSTANCE: A problem instance (n,m,w, c).
OUTPUT: The worst social costWSC(w).
6: BEST NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL COST
INSTANCE: A problem instance (n,m,w, c).
OUTPUT: The best social cost BSC(w).
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7: k-NASHIFY
INSTANCE: A problem instance (n,m,w, c); a pure strategy proﬁle L for the system of the
users and the links.
QUESTION: Is there a sequence of at most k selﬁsh steps that transform L to a (pure) Nash
equilibrium?
The following problem is a variant of k-NASHIFY in which k is part of the input.
8: NASHIFY
INSTANCE: A problem instance (n,m,w, c); a pure strategy proﬁle L for the system of the
users and the links; an integer k > 0.
QUESTION: Is there a sequence of at most k selﬁsh steps that transform L to a (pure) Nash
equilibrium?
In our hardness and completeness proofs, we will employ the following NP-complete
problems [13]:
9: BIN PACKING
INSTANCE: A ﬁnite set U of items, a size s(u) ∈ N for each u ∈ U , a positive integer bin
capacity B, and a positive integer K.
QUESTION: Is there a partition of U into disjoint sets U1, . . . ,UK such that for each set Ui ,
1 iK ,
∑
u∈Ui s(u)B?
10: PARTITION
INSTANCE: A ﬁnite set U and a size s(u) ∈ N for each element u ∈ U .
QUESTION: Is there a subset U ′ ⊆ U such that∑u∈U ′ s(u) =∑u∈U\U ′ s(u)?
We note that BIN PACKING is strongly NP-complete [8,25]. 2
3. Stochastic order relations
In this section, we treat stochastic order relations; we establish a certain stochastic order
relation for the expected maxima of certain sums of Bernoulli random variables. We will
show that in the balls-and-bins game (m balls are thrown at random into m bins), if the sum
of the ball weights is the same, the expected maximum load over all bins is larger when
the balls have different weight in comparison to all balls having the same weight. This will
be used in Section 5 to prove an upper bound on the social cost of a worst mixed Nash
equilibrium.
Recall that a function f :  →  is convex if for all numbers  such that 0 <  < 1,
f (x1 + (1 − )x2)f (x1) + (1 − )f (x2). We proceed to describe a stochastic order
relation between two random variables.
Deﬁnition 3.1. For any pair of arbitrary random variables X and Y, say that X is stochas-
tically more variable than Y if for all increasing and convex functions f :  → ,
E(f (X))E(f (Y )).
2 A problem is stronglyNP-complete if it remainsNP-complete even if any instance of length n is restricted
to contain integers of size polynomial in n. So, stronglyNP-complete problems admit no pseudopolynomial-time
algorithms unless P = NP .
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Call stochastically more variability the corresponding stochastic order relation on the set
of random variables. (See [28, Section 9.5] for a more complete treatment of the notion
of stochastically more variable and [18,30] for more on majorization theory and stochas-
tic orders.) The following lemma [28, Proposition 9.5.1] provides an alternative, analytic
characterization of stochastically more variability.
Lemma 3.1. Consider any pair of non-negative random variables X and X̂. Then, X is
stochastically more variable than X̂ if and only if for all numbers 0, ∫∞
x= Pr(X >
x) dx
∫∞
x= Pr(X̂ > x) dx.
Consider now a setting of the balls-and-bins problem where n balls 1, . . . , nwith trafﬁcs
w1, . . . , wn are allocated into m bins 1, . . . , m uniformly at random. So, for each pair of a
ball i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ [m], deﬁne Bernoulli random variables Y ji = wi with probability
1/m and 0 with probability 1 − 1/m, and Y˜ ji = W/n with probability 1/m and 0 with
probability 1 − 1/m. For each link j ∈ [m], deﬁne the random variables j = ∑i∈[n] Y ji
and ˜j = ∑i∈[n] Y˜ ji ; thus, each of j and ˜j , j ∈ [m], is a sum of Bernoulli random
variables; denote j = E(j ) and ˜j = E(˜j ) the expectations of j and ˜j , respectively.
Note that
j = E
( ∑
i∈[n]
Y
j
i
)
= ∑
i∈[n]
E(Y ji )
= ∑
i∈[n]
(
wi
1
m
+ 0
(
1− 1
m
))
=
∑
i∈[n]wi
m
= W
m
,
while
˜j = E(˜j ) = E
( ∑
i∈[n]
Y˜
j
i
)
= ∑
i∈[n]
E
(
Y˜
j
i
)
= ∑
i∈[n]
(
W
n
1
m
+ 0
(
1− 1
m
))
= n W
n
1
m
= W
m
.
So, j = ˜j for each bin j ∈ [m].
For two numbers x, y ∈ + deﬁne
[x − y] =
{
x − y if x > y,
0 else.
We can then show the following preliminary lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Let bi ∈ + for i ∈ [n] and let d = (1/n)∑ni=1 bi . Then for all x0
n∑
i=1
[bi − x]n · [d − x].
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that b1b2 · · · bn. The claim is true if
x > d . If xb1, then xd and
n∑
i=1
[bi − x] =
n∑
i=1
(bi − x) = n · (d − x).
Now let bj < xbj+1 and d > x. It follows that
n∑
i=1
[bi − x] =
n∑
i=j+1
(bi − x) =
n∑
i=j+1
bi − (n− j)x =
n∑
i=j+1
bi − n · x + j · x

n∑
i=j+1
bi − n · x +
j∑
i=1
bi =
n∑
i=1
bi − n · x
= n · (d − x) 
We ﬁnally prove:
Lemma 3.3 (Stochastically More Variability Lemma). For any trafﬁc vector w, max{1,
. . . , m} is stochastically more variable than max{˜1, . . . , ˜m}.
Proof. Deﬁne the discrete random variablesX = max{1, . . . , m} and X˜ = max{˜1, . . . ,
˜m}. We then have to show that for all 0,∫ ∞
x=
Pr(X > x) dx
∫ ∞
x=
Pr(X˜ > x) dx.
Let Sk be the collection of all pure strategy proﬁles, where the maximum number of trafﬁcs
on any link j ∈ [m] is exactly k. If i = j , then Si ∩ Sj = ∅. Furthermore
n⋃
i=n/m
Si = [m]n.
For any pure strategy proﬁle L ∈ Sk , deﬁne Link(L) to be the smallest index of a link,
holding k trafﬁcs. Furthermore, for any pure strategy proﬁle L, let I (L) be the collection
of users that are assigned to Link(L). Every set of k trafﬁcs is equal to some I (L), L ∈ Sk
with the same probability, say pk . Deﬁne the actual trafﬁc on Link(L) as
b(L) = ∑
i∈I (L)
wi.
If all trafﬁcs are identical the actual trafﬁc on Link(L) for a pure strategy proﬁle L ∈ Sk is
simply b˜(L) = k ·W/n.
Every pure strategy proﬁle L ∈ [m]n occurs with the same probability 1/mn and deﬁnes
together with b(L) a discrete random variable Z. Z is a discrete random variable that can
take every possible value b(L), L ∈ [m]n.
It is easy to see that X is stochastically more variable than Z, since for any pure strategy
proﬁle L, Z refers to the actual trafﬁc on Link(L), whereas X refers to the maximum actual
trafﬁc over all links.
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We will complete our proof by showing that Z is stochastically more variable than X˜.
Since Z and X˜ are discrete random variables,∫ ∞
x=
Pr(Z > x) dx =
n∑
k=n/m
(pk · Ak), where Ak = ∑
L∈Sk
[b(L)− ]
and ∫ ∞
x=
Pr(X˜ > x) dx =
n∑
k=n/m
(pk · A˜k), where A˜k = |Sk| ·
[
k · W
n
− 
]
.
Since for a ﬁxed k each trafﬁc contributes with the same probability to b(L),∑
L∈Sk
b(L) = |Sk| · k · W
n
.
It follows from Lemma 3.2 that AkA˜k for each k. Therefore Z is stochastically more
variable than X˜, which completes the proof of the lemma. 
By deﬁnition of stochastically more variability, Lemma 3.3 immediately implies:
Corollary 3.4. For any trafﬁc vector w,
E(max{1, . . . , m})E(max{˜1, . . . , ˜m}).
In the balls-and-bins game in which m balls are thrown uniformly at random into m bins,
Corollary 3.4 shows that if the sum of the ball weights is the same, the expected maximum
load over all bins is larger when the balls have different weights in comparison to all balls
having the same weight.
4. Pure versus fully mixed Nash equilibria
In this section, we establish the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for the case
of pure Nash equilibria. This result holds also for the model of arbitrary capacities.
We show that the minimum expected latency cost of a user in any (mixed) Nash equi-
librium is at most its minimum expected latency cost in the fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
Afterwards we prove that this implies validity of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Con-
jecture for pure Nash equilibria.
We start by proving:
Lemma 4.1. Fix any trafﬁc vectorw,mixed Nash equilibrium P and user i. Then, i (w,P)
i (w,F).
Proof. Let P = (pjk ),F = (f jk ) for k ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]. Then∑
j∈[m]
( ∑
k∈[n],k =i
p
j
kwk
)
= ∑
k∈[n],k =i
wk
( ∑
j∈[m]
p
j
k
)
= ∑
k∈[n],k =i
wk
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and ∑
j∈[m]
( ∑
k∈[n],k =i
f
j
k wk
)
= ∑
k∈[n],k =i
wk
( ∑
j∈[m]
f
j
k
)
= ∑
k∈[n],k =i
wk.
It follows that∑
j∈[m]
( ∑
k∈[n],k =i
p
j
kwk
)
= ∑
j∈[m]
( ∑
k∈[n],k =i
f
j
k wk
)
,
and therefore there exists some link j0 ∈ [m] such that∑
k∈[n],k =i
p
j0
k wk
∑
k∈[n],k =i
f
j0
k wk.
Then,
i (w,P)  j0i (w,P) (since i is the minimum of all 
j
i , j ∈ [n])
= wi +
∑
k∈[n],k =i p
j0
k wk
cj0

wi +∑k∈[n],k =i f j0k wk
cj0
= j0i (w,F)
= i (w,F) (since f j0i > 0 and F is a Nash equilibrium). 
The following theorem shows that the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture is valid
for pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4.2. Fix any trafﬁc vector w and pure Nash equilibrium L. Then, SC(w,L)
SC(w,F).
Proof. For each user i ∈ [n], i (w,P) is the minimum, over all links j ∈ [m], of the
expected latency cost for user i on link j, and SC(w,P) is the expectation of the maximum
(over all links) latency of trafﬁc through a link. This implies that i (w,P)SC(w,P) for
every mixed Nash equilibrium P. Hence,
i (w,P)  i (w,F) (by Lemma 4.1)
 SC(w,F) (as shown above).
The claim follows now since SC(w,L) = maxi∈[n] i (w,L) holds for every pure Nash
equilibrium L. 
5. Worst mixed Nash equilibria
In this section we show that if n = m and m is suitably large then the social cost of
any Nash equilibrium is at most 2h(1 + ε) times the social cost of the fully mixed Nash
equilibrium. Recall, that h = w1n
W
= w1m
W
.
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Theorem 5.1. Consider the model of identical capacities. Let n = m, m suitably large.
Then, for any trafﬁc vector w and Nash equilibrium P, SC(w,P) < 2h(1 + ε)SC(w,F),
for any ε > 0.
Proof. Fix any trafﬁc vector w and Nash equilibrium P. We start by showing a simple
technical fact.
Claim 1. Fix any pair of a link  ∈ [m] and a user i ∈ view(). Then, pi wi −W/m.
Proof. Clearly,∑
j∈[m]
j = ∑
j∈[m]
( ∑
i∈[n]
p
j
i wi
)
= ∑
i∈[n]
( ∑
j∈[m]
p
j
i wi
)
= ∑
i∈[n]
(
wi
∑
j∈[m]
p
j
i
)
= ∑
i∈[n]
wi = W.
This implies that there exists some link ′ ∈ [m] such that ′W/m. Note that by deﬁnition
of social cost, 
′
i = (1− pi)wi + 
′
. It follows that 
′
i wi +W/m. On the other hand,
i = (1− pi )wi + .
Since i ∈ view(), we have, by deﬁnition of Nash equilibria, that i 
′
i (with equality
holdingwhen i ∈ view(′)). It follows that (1−pi )wi+wi+W/m, or thatpi wi−
W/m, as needed. 
As an immediate consequence of Claim 1, we obtain:
Corollary 5.2. Fix any link  ∈ [m]. Then, (V /(V  − 1))W/m.
Proof. Clearly, by Claim 1,
 = ∑
i∈[n]
pi wi =
∑
i∈view()
pi wi
∑
i∈view()
(
 − W
m
)
= V 
(
 − W
m
)
,
or, by rearrangement of terms, (V /(V  − 1))W/m, as needed. 
Since V 2, V /(V  − 1)2. Thus, by Corollary 5.2:
Lemma 5.3. Fix any link  ∈ [m] with V 2. Then, 2W/m.
We nowprove a complementary lemma. Fix any link  ∈ [m]withV  = 1. Let view(l) =
{i}. Then lwi maxi wiOPT(w)SC(w,F). Thus:
Lemma 5.4. Fix any link  ∈ [m] with V  = 1. Then, SC(w,F).
Use w to deﬁne the vector w˜ with all entries equal toW/n. By deﬁnition of social cost,
SC(w˜,F) is the loadW/m of each ball times the expectedmaximum number of balls thrown
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uniformly at random into m bins. Since n = m, we can state SC (w˜,F) = R(m) ·W/m,
orW/m = SC(w˜,F)/R(m). Fix now any link j ∈ [n] with V j 2. Then,
j  2W
m
(by Lemma 5.3)
= 2w1
h
Furthermore,
SC(w,F)
SC(w˜,F) (by Corollary 3.4)
= R(m)W
m
= R(m)w1
h
(by Deﬁnition of h).
Let r2, r ∈ N. Then, for any constant ε > 0, arbitrarily close to 0,
Pr (j > rh(1+ ε) SC(w,F))
 Pr(j > r(1+ ε)R(m)w1)
(
since SC(w,F)R(m)W
m
= R(m)w1
h
)
.
From Theorem 2.1 it follows that for any  > 0,
Pr(j (1+ )E(j ))  e
−((1+)ln(1+)−)E(j )
w1 = e
E(
j )
w1
(1+ )(1+)E(
j )
w1
<
(
e
1+ 
)(1+)E(j )
w1
.
With (1+ ) = r(1+ ε)R(m) w1E(j ) and since E(
j )  2w1
h
 2w1  rw1 we get:
Pr(j > rh(1+ ε)SC(w,F))  Pr(j > r(1+ ε)R(m)w1)
<
(
e · E(j )
r(1+ ε)R(m)w1
) r(1+ε)R(m)w1
w1

(
e
(1+ ε)R(m)
)r(1+ε)R(m)
=
((
e
(1+ ε)R(m)
)(1+ε)R(m))r
.
Deﬁne now  > 0 so that (/e) = m. Then, clearly,  = −1(m)+(1). Note that
(1+ ε)R(m)= (1+ ε)−1(m)− (1+ ε) 32 + o(1) (by deﬁnition of R(m))
= (1+ ε)−1(m)+(1)
>  (for suitably large m, since ε > 0).
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Since (x/e)x is an increasing function of x, this implies that(
(1+ ε)R(m)
e
)(1+ε)R(m)
>
(
e
) = m.
This implies that((
e
(1+ ε)R(m)
)(1+ε)R(m))r
<
1
mr
.
It follows that
Pr(j > rh (1+ ε)SC(w,F)) < 1
mr
.
Hence
Pr
(
max
∈[m] | |V |2
 > rh(1+ ε)SC(w,F)
)
= Pr
( ∨
∈[m] | |V |2
 > rh(1+ ε)SC(w,F)
)

∑
∈[m] | |V |2
Pr( > rh(1+ ε)SC(w,F))
<
∑
∈[m] | |V |2
1
mr
m · 1
mr
= 1
mr−1
.
Since h  1, r  2 and since l  SC(w,F) for all  ∈ [m] with V  = 1 (by Lemma 5.4),
we have
Pr
(
max
∈[m] 
 > rh(1+ ε)SC(w,F)
)
= Pr
(
max
∈[m] | |V |2
 > rh(1+ ε)SC(w,F)
)
 1
mr−1
,
so that
E
(
max
∈[m] 

)
= ∑
0W
Pr
(
max
∈[m] 
 = 
)
(by deﬁnition of expectation)
= ∑
02h(1+ε)SC(w,F)
Pr
(
max
∈[m] 
 = 
)
+ ∑
2h(1+ε)SC(w,F)<W
Pr
(
max
∈[m] 
 = 
)
M. Gairing et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 343 (2005) 133–157 149
= ∑
02h(1+ε)SC(w,F)
Pr
(
max
∈[m] 
 = 
)
+ ∑
2 r∞
∑
rh(1+ε)SC(w,F)< (r+1)h(1+ε)SC(w,F)
Pr
(
max
∈[m] 
 = 
)
 2h(1+ ε)SC(w,F)Pr
(
max
∈[m] 
 2h(1+ ε)SC(w,F)
)
+ ∑
2 r∞
(r+1)h(1+ε)SC(w,F) ·Pr
(
max
∈[m] 
>rh(1+ε)SC(w,F)
)
< 2h(1+ ε)SC(w,F) · 1
+ ∑
2 r∞
(r + 1)h(1+ ε)SC(w,F) 1
mr−1(
since Pr(max∈[m]  > rh(1+ ε)SC(w,F)) < 1
mr−1
)
= 2h(1+ ε)SC(w,F)
+h(1+ ε)SC(w,F) 1
m
∑
2 r∞
r + 1
mr−2
= 2h(1+ ε)SC(w,F)
+h(1+ ε)SC(w,F) ·O
(
1
m
)
(since
∑
2 r∞ r+1mr−2 = O(1) for m2)
 2h(1+ 2ε)SC(w,F),
for suitable large m. Hence,
SC(w,P) = E
(
max
∈[m] 

)
< 2h(1+ 2ε)SC(w,F)
for any ε, where 0 < ε < 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
If all user trafﬁcs are identical, that is, w1 = w2 = . . . = wn, then h = mw1W = 1. Thus,
Theorem 5.1 immediately implies:
Corollary 0.1. Consider the model of identical capacities. Let n = m,m suitable large.
Then, for any trafﬁc vector w with w1 = w2 = . . . = wn and Nash equilibrium P,
SC(w,P) < (2+ ε)SC(w,F), for any ε > 0.
Recall that there is a randomized, polynomial-time approximation scheme (RPTAS) to
approximate the social cost of any Nash equilibrium (in particular, the fully mixed) within
any arbitrary ε > 0 [7, Theorem 9]. Thus, since, by Theorem 5.1, the worst social cost
is bounded by 2h(1 + ε) times the social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium, this
yields:
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Theorem 5.5. Consider the model of identical capacities. Let n = m, m suitably large.
Then, there exists a randomized, polynomial-time algorithm with approximation factor
2h(1+ ε), for any ε > 0, forWORST NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL COST.
We signiﬁcantly improve Theorem 5.1 under a certain assumption on the trafﬁcs.
Theorem 5.6. Consider any trafﬁc vector w such that w1w2 + · · · + wn. Then, for any
Nash equilibrium P, SC(w,P)SC(w,F).
Proof. Since w1w2 + · · · + wn, it follows that the link with maximum latency has user
1 assigned to it in any pure strategy proﬁle. Thus, in particular, SC(w,P) = 1(w,P) and
SC(w,F) = 1(w,F). By Lemma 4.1, 1(w,P)1(w,F). It follows that SC(w,P)
SC(w,F), as needed. 
6. Best pure Nash equilibria and Nashiﬁcation
We start by establishing NP-hardness for NASHIFY. Then we provide a polynomial-
time algorithm to convert any pure strategy proﬁle into a pure Nash equilibrium with non-
increased social cost. Together with a PTAS for scheduling n jobs on m identical machines
[11], this yields a PTAS for BEST PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM .
Theorem 6.1. NASHIFY is NP-hard, even if m = 2.
Proof. By reduction from PARTITION. Consider any arbitrary instance of PARTITION
consisting of a set A of k items a1, a2, . . . , ak with item sizes s(a1), s(a2), . . . , s(ak) ∈ N,
for any integer k. Construct from it an instance of NASHIFY as follows: Set n = 3k and
m = 2. Set wi = s(ai) for 1 ik, and wi = 1/2k for k + 1 i3k. Take the pure
strategy proﬁle that assigns users 1, 2, . . . , 2k to link 1 and users 2k + 1, . . . , 3k to link 2.
We establish that this yields a reduction from PARTITION to NASHIFY. Assume ﬁrst
that the instance of PARTITION is positive; that is, there exists a subset A′ ⊆ A such
that
∑
a∈A′ s(a) =
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a). Since either |A′|k/2 or |A\A′|k/2, assume, without
loss of generality, that |A′|k/2. Note that each user assigned to link 1 is unsatisﬁed in the
constructed pure strategy proﬁle since its latency cost on link 1 is
∑
a∈A s(a)+ k · 1/2k =∑
a∈A s(a)+ 12 , while its latency cost on link 2 is k · 1/2k = 12 , which is less. Thus, each
step that transfers an unsatisﬁed user that corresponds to an element a ∈ A′ from link 1
to link 2 is a selﬁsh step, and the sequence of steps that transfer all users that correspond
to elements of A′ from link 1 to link 2 is a sequence of at most k/2 < k steps. As a result
of this sequence of selﬁsh steps, the latency of link 1 will be
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a)+ 12 , while the
latency of link 2 will be
∑
a∈A′ s(a) + 12 . Since
∑
a∈A′ s(a) =
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a), these two
latencies are equal and the resulting pure strategy proﬁle is therefore a Nash equilibrium,
which implies that NASHIFY is positive.
Assume now that the instance of NASHIFY is positive; that is, there exists a sequence
of at most k selﬁsh steps that transforms pure strategy proﬁle in the constructed instance
of NASHIFY to a Nash equilibrium. Assume that in the resulting pure strategy proﬁle
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Fig. 1. The algorithm Anashify.
users corresponding to a subset A′ ⊆ A remain in link 1, users corresponding to the subset
A\A′ ⊆ A are transfered to 2, while the sums of trafﬁcs of users with trafﬁc 1/2k that
reside in links 1 and 2 are x and 1− x, respectively; thus, the latencies of links 1 and 2 are∑
a∈A′ s(a)+ x and
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a)+ 1− x, respectively. We consider two cases:
Assume ﬁrst thatA′ = A. Then after at most k selﬁsh steps the latency on link 2 is at most
1 whereas the latency on link 1 is at least
∑
a∈A s(a)k. So there exists an unsatisﬁed user
a ∈ A, a contradiction to the fact that NASHIFY is positive. So let A′ = A. We show that
this implies
∑
a∈A′ s(a)−
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a) = 0.Assume |
∑
a∈A′ s(a)−
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a)| = 0.
Since the trafﬁcs of users inA are integer, this implies |∑a∈A′ s(a)−∑a∈A\A′ s(a)|1.The
fact thatA′ = A shows that at least one user with large trafﬁc was transformed to link 2. So
we can make at most k−1 selﬁsh steps with the small trafﬁcs. However, transforming k−1
small trafﬁcs to the link with smaller latency leaves one user with small trafﬁc unsatisﬁed, a
contradiction to the fact that NASHIFY is positive. So |∑a∈A′ s(a)−∑a∈A\A′ s(a)| = 0,
which implies that PARTITION is positive. 
We remark thatNASHIFY isNP-complete in the strong sense (cf. [9, Section 4.2]) ifm is
part of the input. Thus, there is no pseudopolynomial-time algorithm forNASHIFY (unless
P = NP). In contrast, there is a natural pseudopolynomial-time algorithm Ak-nashify for
k-NASHIFY, which exhaustively searches all sequences of k selﬁsh steps; since a selﬁsh
step involves a (unsatisﬁed) user and a link for a total of mn choices, the running time of
Ak-nashify is ((mn)k). We continue to present an algorithm Anashify that solves NASHIFY
when n selﬁsh steps are allowed (Fig. 1).
The algorithmAnashify sorts the user trafﬁcs in non-increasing order so thatw1 · · · wn.
Then for each user i := 1 to n, it removes user i from the link it is currently assigned, it
ﬁnds the link  with the minimum latency, and it reassigns user i to the link .
The following lemma is crucial to prove the correctness of algorithm Anashify.
Lemma 6.2. A greedy selﬁsh step of an unsatisﬁed user i with trafﬁc wi makes no user k
with trafﬁc wkwi unsatisﬁed.
Proof. Let L = 〈l1, . . . , ln〉 be a pure strategy proﬁle. Furthermore, let p = li and let q be
the link with minimum latency. Denote j and ̂j the latency of link j ∈ [m] before and
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after user i changed its strategy, respectively. Assume that user k becomes unsatisﬁed due
to the move of user i. Since only the latency on link p and q changed, we have to distinguish
between two cases. Either lk = q and user k wants to change its strategy to p, or lk = q and
user k becomes unsatisﬁed due to the additional trafﬁc wi on link q.
First, assume that lk = q, and that user k wants to change its strategy to p. Since user i
changed its strategy from p to q we know that q < ̂p and therefore wk + q < wk + ̂p.
So if user kwants to change its strategy to p, then user kwas already unsatisﬁed before user
i changed its strategy, a contradiction.
For the case that the strategy of user k is q we deﬁne ˜q = q −wk . We have ∀j ∈ [m] :
j + wkj + wiq + wi = ˜q + wk + wi . Therefore k stays satisﬁed. 
Theorem 6.3. Let L = 〈l1, . . . , ln〉 be a pure strategy proﬁle for n users with trafﬁcs
w1, . . . , wn on m links with social cost SC(w,L). Then algorithm Anashify computes a Nash
equilibrium from L with social cost SC(w,L) in O(n log n) time.
Proof. In order to complete the proof of Theorem 6.3, we have to show that algorithm
Anashify returns a pure strategy proﬁle L′ that is a Nash equilibrium and has social cost
SC(w,L′)SC(w,L). It is easy to see that SC(w,L′)SC(w,L), since for user j we
always choose the link with lowest latency as its strategy. After every iteration the user that
changed its strategy is satisﬁed. Since we go through the list of users in descending order
of their trafﬁc and because of Lemma 6.2, all users that changed their strategy in earlier
iterations stay satisﬁed. Therefore after we went through the complete list of users, all users
are satisﬁed and thus L′ is a Nash equilibrium.
The running time of algorithm Anashify is O(n log n) for sorting the n user trafﬁcs,
O(m logm) for constructing a heap with all latencies in the input pure strategy proﬁle
L, and O(n logm) for ﬁnding the minimum element of the heap in each of the n iterations
of the algorithm. Thus, the total running time is O(n log n + m logm + n logm). The in-
teresting case is when mn (since otherwise, a single user can be assigned to each link,
achieving an optimal Nash equilibrium). Thus, in the interesting case, the total running time
of Anashify is O(n log n). 
Running the PTAS of Hochbaum and Shmoys [11] for scheduling n jobs on m iden-
tical machines yields a pure strategy proﬁle L such that SC(w,L)(1 + ε)OPT(w). On
the other hand, applying the algorithm Anashify on L yields a Nash equilibrium L′ such
that SC(w,L′)SC(w,L). Thus, SC(w,L′)(1 + ε)OPT(w). Since also OPT(w)SC
(w,L′), it follows that:
Theorem 6.4. There exists aPTAS forBEST PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM, for the model
of identical capacities.
7. Worst pure Nash equilibria
In this section we consider worst pure Nash equilibria. We start by proving a tight up-
per bound on the social cost of any pure Nash equilibrium. Then, by reduction from BIN
PACKING , we establish NP-hardness for approximating a pure Nash equilibrium with
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worst social costwithin a factor better than2−2/(m+ 1).Weclosewith apseudopolynomial-
time algorithm to compute a worst pure Nash equilibrium if the number of links is ﬁxed.
Denote with m-WCpNE the decision problem corresponding to the problem to compute
the worst-case pure Nash equilibrium for n users with trafﬁcs w1, . . . , wn on m links. If m
is part of the input, then we call the problemWCpNE. We ﬁrst show:
Theorem 7.1. Fix any trafﬁc vector w and pure Nash equilibrium L. Then, SC(w,L)/
OPT(w)2− 2/(m+ 1). Furthermore, this upper bound is tight.
Proof. Schuurman and Vredeveld [29] showed the tightness of the upper bound for jump
optimal schedules proved by Finn and Horowitz [6]. Since every pure Nash equilibrium
is also jump optimal, the upper bound follows directly. Greedy selﬁsh steps on identical
links can only increase the minimum load over all links. Thus, we can transform every
jump optimal schedule into a Nash equilibrium without altering the makespan, proving
tightness. 
Theorem 7.2. It isNP-hard to ﬁnd a pure Nash equilibrium L withWC(w)/SC(w,L) <
2− 2/(m+ 1)− ε, for any ε > 0. It isNP-hard in the strong sense if the number of links
m is part of the input.
Proof. We show that for a certain class of instances we have to solve BIN PACKING in
order to ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium with desired property. BIN PACKING isNP-complete in
the strong sense [9]. Consider an arbitrary instance of BIN PACKING consisting of a set
of items U = {u1, . . . , u|U |} with sizes s(uj ),
∑
uj∈U = m − 1, and K = m − 1 bins
of capacity B = 1. From this instance we construct an instance for the stated problem as
follows: Set ε = 2. There are n−2 = |U | users with trafﬁcwi = s(ui) and two users with
trafﬁc wn−1 = wn = 1. Note that the social cost of a Nash equilibrium is either 2 when the
users with trafﬁc 1 are on the same link, or at most (m+ 1)/m+  otherwise.
If BIN PACKING is negative, then there exists no Nash equilibrium with both users with
trafﬁc 1 on the same link. Thus every Nash equilibrium has the desired property. If BIN
PACKING is positive, then there exists a Nash equilibrium with both users with trafﬁc 1 on
the same link. The social cost of this Nash equilibrium isWC(w) = 2. For any other Nash
equilibrium Lwhere the users with trafﬁc 1 use different links, SC(w,L)(m+ 1)/m+.
This yields
WC(w)
SC(w,L)
 2
m+ 1
m
+ 
= 2
m+ 1
m
+ ε
2
= 2m
m+ 1+ εm
2
= 2− 2
m+ 1+ εm
2
− εm
m+ 1+ εm
2
> 2− 2
m+ 1 − ε.
So, to ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium with desired property, we have to ﬁnd a distribution of the
small trafﬁcs w1, . . . , wn−2 to m− 1 links which solves BIN PACKING.
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Since BIN PACKING is NP-hard in the strong sense, if the number of bins is part of
the input, it follows that computing a pure Nash equilibrium L with WC(w)/SC(w,L) <
2− 2/(m+ 1)− ε is also NP-hard in the strong sense, if m is part of the input. 
Since WCpNE is NP-hard in the strong sense [7], there exists no pseudopolynomial
algorithm to solveWCpNE . However, we can give such an algorithm for m-WCpNE .
Theorem 7.3. There exists a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm for m-WCpNE .
Proof. We start with the state set S0 in which all links are empty. After inserting the ﬁrst
i trafﬁcs, the state set Si consists of all (2m)-tuples (1, w˜1, . . . , m, w˜m) describing a
possible placement of the largest i trafﬁcs with j being the latency on link j and w˜j the
smallest trafﬁc placed on link j. We need at most m · |Si | steps to create Si+1 from Si ,
and |Si |(Wi)m · (w1)m, whereWi =∑ij=1wj . Therefore the overall computation time is
bounded by O(n ·m ·Wm ·(w1)m). The best-case Nash equilibrium and the worst-case Nash
equilibriumcanbe foundby exhaustive search over the state setSn usingO(n·m·Wm·(w1)m)
time. 
Remark. Theorem 7.3 also holds for the case of arbitrary link capacities.
8. Conclusions and discussion
In this work, we have studied the combinatorial structure and the computational com-
plexity of the extreme (either worst or best) Nash equilibria for the selﬁsh routing game
introduced in the pioneering work of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16].
Our study of the combinatorial structure has revealed an interesting, highly non-trivial,
combinatorial conjecture about the worst such Nash equilibrium, namely the Fully Mixed
Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, abbreviated as FMNE Conjecture; the conjecture states that
the fully mixed Nash equilibrium [19] is the worst Nash equilibrium in the setting we
consider. We have established that the FMNE Conjecture is valid when restricted to pure
Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we have come close to establishing the FMNE Conjecture in
its full generality by proving that the social cost of any (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium is
within a factor of 2h(1+ε), for any ε > 0, of that of the fullymixedNash equilibrium,where
h is the factor by which the largest user trafﬁc deviates from the average user trafﬁc, and
under the assumptions that all link capacities are identical, the number of users is equal to the
number of links and the number of links is suitably large. The proof of this result has relied
very heavily on applying and extending techniques from the theory of stochastic orders
and majorization [18,30]; such techniques are imported for the ﬁrst time into the context
of selﬁsh routing, and their application and extension are both of independent interest. We
hope that the application and extension of techniques from the theory of stochastic orders
and majorization will be valuable to further studies of the selﬁsh routing game considered
in this paper and for the analysis and evaluation of mixed Nash equilibria for other games
as well.
Our study of the computational complexity of extreme Nash equilibria has resulted in
both positive and negative results. On the positive side, we have devised, for the case of
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identical link capacities, equal numbers of users and links and a suitably large number of
links, a randomized, polynomial-time algorithm to approximate the worst social cost within
a factor arbitrarily close to 2h(1+ ε), for any ε > 0. The approximation factor 2h(1+ ε) of
this randomized algorithm will immediately improve upon reducing 2h further down in our
combinatorial result described above, relating the social cost of any Nash equilibrium to
that of the fully mixed.We have also introduced the technique of Nashiﬁcation as a tool for
converging to a Nash equilibrium starting with any assignment of users to links in a way that
does not increase the social cost; coupling this techniquewith a polynomial-time approxima-
tion scheme for the optimal assignment of users to links [11] has yielded a polynomial-time
approximation scheme for the social cost of the bestNash equilibrium. In sharp contrast, we
have established a tight limit on the approximation factor of any polynomial-time algorithm
that approximates the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium (assuming P = NP).
Our approximability and inapproximability results for the best and worst Nash equilibria,
respectively, establish an essential difference between the approximation properties of the
two types of extreme Nash equilibria.
The most obvious problem left open by our work is to establish the FMNE Conjecture.
Some progress on this problem has been already reported by Lücking et al. [17], where
the conjecture is proved in various special cases of the model of selﬁsh routing introduced
by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16] and considered in this work; furthermore, Lücking
et al. disprove the FMNE Conjecture in a different model for selﬁsh routing that borrows
from the model of unrelated machines [12] studied in the scheduling literature.
The technique of Nashiﬁcation, as an algorithmic tool for the computation of Nash equi-
libria, also deserves further study. Some steps in this direction have been taken already by
Feldmann et al. [5].
Establishment of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture will reveal an interesting
complexity-theoretic contrast between theworst pure andmixedNash equilibria. On the one
hand, computing the (supports of) the worst pure Nash equilibrium is anNP-hard problem
[7, Theorem 4]; however, computing the social cost of a worst pure Nash equilibrium is
trivially in P (since it amounts to computing the maximum). On the other hand, if the
fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture is true, computing the supports of a worst mixed
Nash equilibrium is a trivial problem and, moreover, the polynomial characterization of the
fully mixed Nash equilibrium shown in [19, Theorem 14] implies that a worst mixed Nash
equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time; however, computing the social of a worst
mixed Nash equilibrium remains #P-complete. This result follows from an inspection of
the proof of [7, Theorem 8], which establishes that computing the social cost of a Nash
equilibrium is a #P-complete problem. We consider this different behavior of pure and
mixed Nash equilibria to be an interesting complexity-theoretic consequence of the Fully
Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture.
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